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EPISTEMOLOGY LEGALIZED: OR, TRUTH,
JUSTICE, AND THE AMERICAN WAY
SUSAN HAACK*
...
the man of mere theory is in the practical sphere an useless
and dangerous pedant.
- F. H. Bradley'
It's a little unexpected; but perhaps I shouldn't be too surprised to find myself called upon to play the role of jurisprude. I did, after all, once publish an
essay entitled "Confessions of an Old-Fashioned Prig" 2-an essay in which I
tried to articulate why it matters whether you care about the truth, and what
has gone wrong in the thinking of those, like Richard Rorty, who profess to
believe that truth is "entirely a matter of solidarity, '3 that the supposed ideal
of concern for truth is a kind of superstition, and that standards of better and
worse evidence are nothing but local, parochial conventions. And all this had
a quite direct bearing on my present topic; for if Rorty & Co. were right, we
would surely stand in need of the most urgent and radical revision not only of
our legal thinking, but of our legal system itself.
Jeremy Bentham's powerful metaphor of "Injustice, and her handmaid
Falsehood" reminds us,4 if we need reminding, that justice requires not only
just laws, and just administration of those laws, but also factual truth- objective factual truth; and that in consequence the very possibility of a just legal
system requires that there be objective indications of truth, i.e., objective
standards of better or worse evidence. Any case would illustrate the point, but
the case of Kerry Kotler is especially vivid: in 1992, after serving eleven years
of a twenty-five-to-fifty year sentence for rape, Kotler was released from
prison when DNA evidence established that he was not the perpetrator; less
than three years later, he was charged with another rape, and again convicted

* The author thanks Giovanni Tuzet for helpful correspondence, and Mark Migotti for
very helpful comments on a draft-and for thinking up the title (however, she notes that the
subtitle is All Her Own Work).
1. F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (London: Henry S. King and Co., 1876), 204.
2. Susan Haack, "Confessions of an Old-Fashioned Prig," in Haack, Manifesto of a
PassionateModerate: UnfashionableEssays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 7-

30.
3. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), 32.
4. Jeremy Bentham, RationaleofJudicialEvidence (London: Hunt and Clarke, 1827; New
York: Garland, 1978), vol. I, 22.
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-this time on DNA evidence.' But unless there were an objective fact of the
matter about which rape, or rapes, Kotler committed, and unless DNA
evidence were objectively more truth-indicative than eyewitness testimony,
etc., this would be, not justice, but a ghastly farce. Not to labor the point: the
law is up to its neck in epistemology.
When Bentham published his Rationale of Judicial Evidence in 1827 the
theory of evidence was, as he observed, largely unexplored and uncharted. By
now, the territory is much traveled by legal scholars, and even visited by the
occasional venturesome philosophical tourist. I can't hope to offer anything to
rival the map Bentham himself drew, either in scope or in detail; nor can I
aspire to a scholarly treatment of his remarkable treatise, let alone of the subsequent literature. My plan is, rather, to sketch some epistemological themes
of mine, and explore their bearing on two familiar, radical epistemological
criticisms of our legal system: (i) that an adversarial system is an epistemologically poor way of determining the truth; and (ii) that exclusionary rules of
evidence are epistemologically undesirable. Neither criticism, I shall argue, is
decisive; both, however, throw harsh light on disturbing aspects of the way our
adversarial system functions in practice.
The task I have set myself requires coming to terms with the inevitable
tensions between philosophical and legal thinking-epistemology being the
part of philosophy to which it falls to articulate what evidence is and what
makes it better or worse, the law of evidence being, rather, a mesh of practices,
procedures, and rules regulating the legal handling of evidence. Epistemology,
like philosophy generally, is essentially universal; the law of evidence, like the
law generally, varies from place to place and from time to time. Moreover, my
task requires thinking about "the law(s) of evidence" in the broadest sense: i.e.,
not only about legal rules of admissibility and exclusion of evidence, burdens
and standards of proof, and so forth, but also about the procedures and practices that structure legal efforts to determine the truth.6 Additionally, the task
requires discriminating those questions about the law of evidence that epistemology can reasonably be expected to illuminate, and those which, because
they involve value judgments of other kinds, are beyond the reach of purely
epistemological argument. On top of which, it requires an epistemology that
is-well, true; for mistaken epistemology can only obscure, and not illuminate, legal issues. I will do what I can.
5. Edward Connors, Thomas Lundgren, Neal Miller, and Tom McEwen, Convicted by
Juries,Exoneratedby Science (Department of Justice: NIJ Research Report, June 1996), 61-64.
The victim in the earlier crime had identified Kotler both in a photo array and in a line-up. Ibid.
6. On broader and narrower conceptions of the law of evidence, see William Twining,
"What Is the Law of Evidence?" in Twining, Rethinking Evidence (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990),
178-218.
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I. EPISTEMOLOGY: EVIDENCE, INQUIRY, ADVOCACY

Inquiry is something just about everyone engages in just about every day,
when they want to know the source of a bad smell, the cause of a delayed
flight, or whatever; and it is the professional occupation of scientists, historians, detectives, investigative journalists, of legal and literary scholars, and of
philosophers, among others. Unlike such other human activities as cooking
dinner, composing a symphony, dancing, debating, or pleading a case before
the Supreme Court, inquiry is an attempt to discover the truth of some question
or questions. To understand this, no elaborately articulated theory of truth is
needed; it is sufficient that the concept of truth satisfy the Aristotelian Insight,
that "to say of what is not that it is not, or of what is that it is, is true"-that a
proposition be true just in case things are as it says. Someone who is trying to
find out whether the butler did it, for example, wants to end up believing that
the butler did it if the butler did it; that the butler didn't do it if the butler
didn't do it; and that it's more complicated than that if it's more complicated
than that.
Inquiry involves, first, being struck by a question. If the answer is to be
found by means of some familiar routine, you just do what is needed (look up
the number in the phone book, or whatever). If the answer is not so easily
found, however, the next step is to make a conjecture which, if true, would
answer the question at issue; figure out its consequences; check out how well
those consequences stand up to any evidence you already have and any further
evidence you can lay your hands on; and then use your judgment whether to
stick with your conjecture, modify it, abandon it and start again--or suspend
judgment until more evidence comes along. Inquiry is better conducted the
more insightful, imaginative, and informed the conjectures, the more rigorous
the reasoning, the more thorough the search for evidence, and the more scrupulously honest and (as we say) judicious the weighing of evidence. Strictly
speaking, in fact, if you are trying to find evidence to support a foregone
conclusion rather than following the evidence where it leads, you aren't really
inquiring; which is why, when the government or our university institutes an
Official Inquiry into this or that, some of us reach for our scare quotes.
An inquirer's business is to discover the true answer to his question; so his
obligation is to seek out what evidence he can and assess it as fairly as possible. An advocate's business is to make the strongest possible case that thishis side's-answer is the true one; so he will be most effective if he selects and
emphasizes whatever evidence favors the proposition in question, and ignores
or plays down the rest. So, again strictly speaking, "disinterested inquirer" is
a kind of pleonasm, and "biased inquirer" an oxymoron. But in real life, obviously, it's a lot messier. Probably nobody is of rock-solid, across-the-board
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intellectual integrity, and even the most honest inquirers have their prejudices
and blind spots; so the distinction between inquiry and advocacy can get
blurry.
The concepts of inquiry and of evidence are intimately intertwined. The evidence with respect to factual, empirical claims is a complex mesh in which
experiential evidence, i.e., the evidence of the senses, and reasons, i.e.,
background beliefs, work together like the clues and ramifying intersecting
entries in a crossword puzzle. How reasonable a crossword entry is depends
on how well it is supported by the clue and any completed intersecting entries;
on how reasonable those other entries are, independent of the entry in question; and on how much of the crossword has been completed. Similarly, how
well a factual claim is warranted by evidence depends on how well it is supported by experiential evidence and background beliefs; on how secure those
background beliefs are, independent of the claim in question; and on how
much of the relevant evidence the evidence includes. Relevance is not a matter
of logic, but depends on matters of fact. For example: though someone who
believes that character can be determined by handwriting may think that this
job applicant's looping her g's is relevant to whether she is trustworthy,
whether it is relevant depends on whether handwriting actually does indicate
character.
How supportive evidence is of a claim depends on how well it anchors the
claim in experience, and how well it integrates it into an explanatory account;
i.e., on how good the circumstances of any relevant observations were, and
how well the claim in question fits into an explanatory story with the other
relevant facts presumed known. But supportiveness alone is not enough; the
warrant of a claim also depends on how warranted the reasons that support it
are, independent of the claim itself. This involves no vicious circle, for eventually we arrive at sensory evidence, which neither has nor stands in need of
warrant; and nor does it leave the whole mesh of evidence dangling in mid-air,
for sensory evidence anchors it in the world. Even supportiveness and independent security together are not enough; the warrant of a claim also depends
on how much of the relevant evidence the evidence includes-for however
supportive and secure the evidence is, it won't give strong warrant to the claim
in question if it omits some essential facts. It is because comprehensiveness is
one determinant of quality of evidence that thorough inquiry requires not only
sifting and weighing the available evidence, but also, when necessary, seeking
out additional evidence (which reminds me to remind you of the two meanings
of "partial": "biased" and "incomplete").
Even working on some question alone, without benefit of collaborators or
rivals, involves a kind of dialogue with yourself: trying out a conjecture,
imagining possible objections, working out possible responses-or simply
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looking over what you typed yesterday and wondering "what was I thinking?"
But life is short; and rather than seeking out evidence for ourselves, firsthand,
most of the time we depend on what others tell us. I rely on an airline representative's answer to a question about plane schedules; a historian relies on a
colleague's authentication of a document; astronomers rely on observations
made by another team in another hemisphere, or on observations made in
China a millennium ago. Often enough we interpret what others say, and take
their competence and honesty for granted, without giving the matter serious
thought; but sometimes we have to struggle to understand what others say or
write, and sometimes we suspect they may be confused or misinformed, or
have reason to deceive us. And even when evidence-sharing seems effortless,
it depends implicitly on the grounds each inquirer has for justified confidence
in others' competence and honesty.
Both cooperation and competition can advance inquiry. Cooperation can
enable productive division of labor and the pooling of evidential resources;
competition can be a powerful incentive to intellectual effort, and to honesty.
And of course the engagement of many people, whether cooperatively or competitively, extends the time available for seeking out and scrutinizing evidence.
Indeed, one strength of natural-scientific inquiry is precisely that (even though
research projects are doubtless sometimes hurried or cut short because a grant
is running out, a publication deadline must be met, etc.) a question can be pursued by generation after generation of scientific workers until a solution is
finally reached. Unfortunately, however, both cooperation and competition can
turn sour and counterproductive. Cooperation may be real mutual help; but it
can turn into mere mutual support and boosterism. Competition may be honest
mutual criticism or honest rivalry for priority; but it can breed mere rhetoric
and counter-rhetoric, posturing and counter-posturing. And at its worst, competition gone sour can even lead to the misrepresentation, distortion, or concealment of evidence.
We describe disagreements among proponents of rival scientific theories or
historical claims as "debates"; and participants in such controversies sometimes engage in something that looks a lot like advocacy. Moreover, eloquence
and appeals to authority sometimes produce an artificial consensus, at least
temporarily. But disagreements among inquirers, unlike debates between rival
advocates, cannot be decided by a vote on the basis of rival presentations; they
will settle on a conclusion only if and when the evidence brings the community of inquirers to a genuine, unforced consensus.
When we need the answer to some question in a hurry, we may be obliged
to curtail our search for further evidence, as well as our scrutiny of the evidence already in hand-as we may choose to do when the question doesn't
seem important enough to warrant the time and trouble a thorough search or
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scrutiny would take, or when an answer already seems well-enough warranted
that additional effort is a waste of time. And we are often faced with urgent
practical problems-a medical emergency, say, when a decision about treatment must be made at once, and can't wait for new evidence to settle disagreement in the field; or an intelligence emergency, where some action must be
taken now, on information known to be incomplete. In such circumstances, we
have no choice but to decide what to do on the basis of whatever evidence we
have-if we're wise, taking what backup precautions we can against the
possibility that the evidence in hand is misleading. All this has a quite direct
bearing on legal determinations of truth.7
11.LEGALIZING IT ALL

But as we leave the epistemological high ground for the legal bramblepatch, we encounter a dense tangle of questions.
For example: To what extent do legal and epistemological conceptions of
evidence coincide, and how, where, and why do they diverge? They coincide
only partially, for the law focuses on evidence that can be produced in court:
i.e., on testimony, and sometimes on physical things-photographs, weapons,
etc.-which would more likely be classified by an epistemologist as the
objects of sensory evidence. What could epistemology tell us about such legal
notions as proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the weight of evidence, the preponderance of evidence? My epistemology, at any rate, has a good deal to say
about what makes evidence better or worse and a claim more or less warranted, but relatively little about the grades of proof that are of peculiar legal
concern; which-if Richard Posner's report that judges' estimates of what
degree of probability represents "beyond a reasonable doubt" range from 75%
to 95% is anything to go by---seem to be disturbingly vague. What could
epistemology contribute to the debate between "fact-based" and "story-based"
approaches in the "New Evidence Scholarship"? 9 I call my approach "foundherentist" because it combines the plausible elements of foundationalism (in
7. 1 have drawn in this section on the following earlier work of mine: Susan Haack,
Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993),
especially chapter 4; "Confessions of an Old-Fashioned Prig," supra, note 2; "The Same, Only
Different, "InternationaleZeitschriftfiirPhilosophie,2002.1 (2002) 18-22; DefendingScience
-Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2003),
especially chapter 3.
8. Richard Posner, Frontiersin Legal Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2001), 367.
9. See Richard Lempert, "The New Evidence Scholarship," in Probabilityand the Law
of Evidence: The Uses and Limits of Bayesianism, eds. Peter Tillers and Eric D. Green
(Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1988), 61-102.
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virtue of giving an appropriate role to experience) and of coherentism (in
virtue of also giving an appropriate role to mutual support among beliefs).
Though the vocabulary is different, the ideas are essentially similar: the "factbased" approach is foundationalist in structure and spirit, the "story-based"
approach coherentist; and foundherentism shows that we can combine the
strengths, and avoid the weaknesses, of both theories.
But these questions are relatively small potatoes compared to the radical
epistemological criticisms of adversarialism, and of exclusionary rules of evidence, mentioned earlier. Wisely or not, I am going to see if I can handle these
not-so-small-and probably uncomfortably hot-epistemologico-legal potatoes.
H. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF ADVERSARIALISM
"Some persons fancy that bias and counter-bias are favorable to the extraction of truth-that hot and partisan debate is the way to investigate. This is the
theory of our atrocious legal procedure. But Logic puts its heel upon this
suggestion"; thus C. S. Peirce, the greatest of American philosophers, in a
discussion of the methods of inquiry.' 0 Almost a century later, Judge Marvin
Frankel writes: "We proclaim to each other and to the world that the clash of
adversaries is a powerful means for hammering out the truth.... [But d]espite
our untested statements of self-congratulation, we know that others searching
after facts-in history, geography, medicine, whatever-do not emulate our
adversarial system.""
As I have stressed, inquiry is a very different enterprise from advocacy.
Moreover, Peirce was right to warn that when "it is no longer the reasoning
which determines what the conclusion shall be, but the conclusion which
determines what the reasoning shall be," the inevitable result will be "a rapid
deterioration of intellectual vigor": "man loses his conception of truth and of
reason," and comes to think of reasoning as "merely decorative," until "the
truth for him is that for which he fights."' 2 To allow a clash of "bias and
counter-bias" to replace a search for and scrutiny of evidence in the sciences,
history, etc., really would be, as Peirce insisted, a recipe for disaster (a disaster
that presently constitutes a real threat to our academic, indeed our intellectual,
culture). However, Peirce's assumption that the theory of our legal procedure
10. Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers,eds. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and
Arthur Burks (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931-58), 2.635. References are
by volume and paragraph number; the passage is dated 1878.
11. Marvin F. Frankel, "The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View," University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 123.5 (May 1975) 1031-59, 1036.
12. Peirce, Collected Papers,supra, note 10, 1.57-.58 (c. 1896).
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is that allowing rival advocates to have at it is a good way to inquire is, to say
the least, a considerable over-simplification.
First, a legal system isn't exactly, as science is, a kind of inquiry; it is better
described as a set of rules and machinery for resolving disputes and making it
possible for people to live together in some kind of order. Not that inquiry is
irrelevant to the law; but the reason it is relevant is that we want, not simply
resolutions, but just resolutions. And legal inquiry operates under a kind of
time constraint not relevant to physics, history, etc.; for, with good reason, the
law seeks, in the words of Justice Blackmun, "quick, final and binding ...
judgments" -the desideratum of promptness imposing time constraints at one end
of the process, and the desideratum of finality-and-bindingness at the other.
Second, our adversarial system isn't advocacy all the way down; a trial is
only one stage of the process, after the investigations of the police, the FBI, the
attorneys for each side and their investigators, after an indictment, and so on.
Although in a sense (as the Supreme Court averred in a 1966 ruling) "[t]he
basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth,"' 4 a trial is quite unlike
a scientific or historical investigation. Rather, it is a late stage 5 of a whole
process in which a decision is made as to a defendant's guilt or liability, the
stage at which the finder of fact sifts through the evidence presented by the
advocates for each side and assesses whether it establishes guilt or liability to
the required degree of proof. Moreover, legal determinations are constrained
not only by the desire to arrive at factually correct verdicts, but also by other,
non-truth-related desiderata: that citizens' constitutional rights must be
respected; that it is much worse to convict an innocent man than to acquit a
guilty one; and so on.
So the question is not, as Peirce apparently took for granted, whether "hot
and partisan debate is the way to investigate"; rather, it is whether an adversarial trial conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence, in combination
with pre-trial investigation itself undertaken in the knowledge that the trial will
be conducted in this way and subject to these rules, and given the concern for
promptness and finality as well as constitutional constraints and other nonepistemological desiderata, is a tolerably good way of arriving at verdicts that
often enough find guilty defendants guilty and innocent defendants not guilty,
and find for the plaintiff if and only if the defendant is liable.
Obviously it is not within the competence of epistemology alone to tell us
what weight to give considerations about efficiency in arriving at the truth and
13.
14.
15.
include

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
Tehan v. United States, 383 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
I write of "a late stage," rather than "the final stage," because a full account would
the appeals process.
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what to such other desiderata as promptness and finality; nor, therefore, to tell
us how good an approximation to invariably true verdicts is "tolerably good,"
since this requires just such weighing of epistemological values against values
of other kinds. As I see it, while justice delayed is justice denied, nonetheless
late is better than never; so that, e.g., we certainly should be willing to consider
revision of rules about the introduction of new evidence, etc., now that DNA
analysis can show decisively whether someone convicted of a long-ago crime
was actually the perpetrator. But I want to concentrate on the epistemological
core of our question.
The best case that could be made for the epistemological efficacy of an
adversarial system, given the special circumstances under which the legal
search for truth is conducted, would run somewhat as follows. Since for good
reason the legal process, unlike the process of scientific inquiry, has to be
concluded within a relatively short time frame, we need a way of ensuring that
the search for and scrutiny of evidence is as thorough as that time frame
allows. An adversarial system is one way to do this. If everyone involved
knows that eventually, at the trial stage, the determination will be made by an
impartial jury weighing the evidence developed and presented by the parties,
each subject to cross-examination by the other, this should encourage precisely
the kind of thoroughness we are aiming to achieve. For an advocate's goal is
to win; so counsel for each party is motivated to seek out evidence favoring his
side of the case, and to bring out the flaws in evidence pointing the other way.
To be sure, the process isn't perfect; but it is a reasonable substitute for the
ideal, as something not dissimilar might be in the case of an urgent medical or
6
intelligence decision.'
This optimistic argument is right, up to a point: the adversarial process can
enable thorough evidential search and scrutiny. However, the optimistic argument is right only up to a point: the adversarial process will enable thorough
evidential search and scrutiny only if, for example, the resources available to
each side for search and scrutiny of evidence are adequate and comparable, if
juries are willing and able to decide cases on the basis of the evidence, etc.
And this obliges us to ask how well the adversarial process we presently have
really works.

16. Compare the Devil's Advocate in sainthood proceedings, asked to play his adversarial
role to guard against the possibility that other noses will be so deadened by the odor of sanctity
that they won't smell a rat if there is one.
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Our present trial system, with its very specific, formalized division of labor,
is of course an artefact of history. English courts once relied less on juries than
on in-court tests by oath and ordeal, tests based on the assumption that God
would punish those who swore falsely, would ensure that an innocent man's
arm was not scalded as he plunged it into boiling water, and so on: on "proof,"
that is, in the old sense of the word, as in "the proof of the pudding is in the
eating." After 1215, when the 4th Lateran Council prohibited priests from
taking part in such tests, jury trials became commoner, but these early jury
trials differed significantly from jury trials today; e.g., jurors might be specially chosen for their special expertise (such as a jury of vintners if the defendant was accused of selling bad wine), or they might be allowed to go around
the town investigating the alleged offense for themselves. 7 Certainly our
present system is a better way of arriving at factually correct verdicts than
trials by oath or ordeal; probably it is better than those early jury trials (though
the specialized jury may have had its merits-after all, a panel of physicians
would likely be better than a random selection of lay persons at assessing the
evidence relevant to an emergency medical decision). But it certainly isn't
perfect-as, if we could ask him, Thomas Barefoot might tell us.
After Mr. Barefoot was convicted of murder in the state of Texas, two psychiatrists testified at his sentencing hearing (as required by the Texas deathpenalty statute) as to the likelihood that he would be dangerous in future.
Neither had ever met him; and one, Dr. Grigson-who testified that there was
a "one hundred percent and absolute" chance that Barefoot would commit
future acts of violence 18-was so notorious for his pro-prosecution testimony
at such hearings that he had earned the nickname "Dr. Death." (Between 1973
and 1994 he testified in over 140 capital cases, in more than 90% of which the
jury sentenced the defendant to death). 9 Questioned by Barefoot's attorney
about studies showing that psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are
wildly unreliable, Dr. Holbrook said he disagreed with their conclusion, and
Dr. Grigson that he was not familiar with most of them, and that in any case
they were accepted by only a "small minority group" of psychiatrists. Barefoot
was duly sentenced to death.
17. See Frederic William Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1909), lecture II; Stephan Landsman, "Of Witches, Madmen, and
Product Liability: An Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony," 13 BehavioralScience
and Law (1995) 131-57.
18. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 909 (1983) (Justice Blackmun, dissenting). iiit
19. Amnesty International, Urgent Action notice, "United States of America (Texas): Death
penalty/legal concern, Bobby Glen Cook," available at http://web.amnesty.org/library.index/
EGAMR510282003; and cited in Thomas Regnier, "Barefoot in Quicksand: The Future of
'Future Dangerousness' Predictions in Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of Daubertand
Kumho," University of Akron Law Review 37.3 (2004) 467-507, 481, n. 80.
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When the case found its way to the Supreme Court, the American Psychiatric Association submitted an amicus brief acknowledging that two out of three
psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are mistaken. However, in his
ruling for the majority, observing that the APA didn't say that such predictions
were wrong all the time, only most of the time, Justice White dismissed the
argument that the jury should not have been allowed to hear this evidence;
relevant federal and state law anticipates, he pointed out, that cross-examination and the presentation of contrary evidence are the appropriate means of
unmasking dubious testimony.2" This probably wasn't a lot of comfort to Barefoot, who was executed in 1984.
To be sure, we don't have a definitive list of who is really guilty and who
is not, who is really liable and who is not, against which to check whether our
adversarial process results in jury verdicts that are usually, often, or rarely
factually correct. Nevertheless, we have ample reason to think that the process
fails dismayingly often: those DNA exonerations, for one thing-which are
likely only the tip of the iceberg, since every innocent man exonerated by
DNA was convicted on some evidence, probably evidence of a kind on which
other innocent people were also convicted who can't be exonerated by DNA
because there is no material to test; and the wildly inconsistent verdicts in tort
cases involving the same chemicals, drugs, or devices and the same alleged
damage, for another. On this point, I fear, Peirce only exaggerates: "We
employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the facts before
them with the greatest care, the 'perfection of human reason' presides over the
presentment, they hear, they go out and deliberate, they come to a unanimous
opinion, and it is generally admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as
2
well have tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's glory!" '
A hoary old joke defines a jury as "twelve people whose job it is to decide
which side has the better lawyer." We laugh; but uneasily, for we know that
the resources available to many criminal defendants are pitifully small, and
that the contingency-fee system can't always redress the inequality of
resources of an individual plaintiff and a mammoth corporate defendant. There
are grounds for doubting even that the system ensures that evidential search
and scrutiny is most thorough when there is most at stake.22
Again, we read that better-educated jurors are likelier to find ways to avoid
jury duty, and likelier to be challenged if they are empaneled. Besides the
20. Barefoot v. Estelle, supra, note 18, 898.
21. Peirce, Collected Papers,supra, note 10, 1.626 (1898).
22. At the time of Barefoot's conviction and sentencing, the sum available for an indigent
Texas defendant in a death-penalty case for "investigation and experts" was $500; one wonders
how much might have been spent at that time by the defense team for, say, a celebrity accused
of shoplifting, or a sports star accused of sexual assault.
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expensive jury consultants employed in high-profile cases, now there is
demographically based computer software to help attorneys identify which
members of a jury pool may be expected to be sympathetic to their side, which
to be sympathetic to the other, and which neutral.23 We may even begin to lose
our grip on what it means for a jury to be "impartial," and to wonder whether
it isn't too much to ask that each juror be willing to go with the evidence; isn't
it enough that a jury be fairly divided between those prejudiced in one direction and those prejudiced in the other? And now, with the opportunity to watch
real jury deliberations on television,24 we will wonder how thoroughly jurors
understand judges' instructions, how often one juror succumbs to pressure
from the others to conform, and how often jurors compromise on a verdict
which, rather than representing anyone's real opinion, simply gets things over
with in a way all of them can more or less live with.
Moreover, in our overburdened system, the proportion of cases decided by
a jury is quite small. 2' And even if, as it may be said, attorneys negotiating a
plea bargain or a settlement agreement are relying on their assessment of the
chances of success at a trial, the optimistic argument now requires a further
assumption: that attorneys often enough can and do predict correctly what the
result would be if a case were to go to a jury-i.e., it relies not only on the
approximation of jury verdicts to the truth, but also on the approximation of
attorneys' predictions to jury verdicts.
On top of which, just as competition in inquiry sometimes does, the culture
of adversarialism can turn sour and counter-productive. In fact, a central theme
of Judge Frankel's now-classic paper was that exactly this was happening:
while counsel "must not knowingly break the law or countenance fraud...
[w]ithin these unconfining limits, advocates freely employ time-honored tricks
and stratagems to block or distort the truth." Attorneys manage strategically
"to avoid too much knowledge"; they use the very devices which can test dishonest witnesses and help ferret out falsehoods to make honest witnesses look
shifty and competent witnesses look confused; they shop for complaisant
experts. 2266 As a result, rather than engaging in the thorough search for and
scrutiny of evidence that the optimistic argument assumes, they may actually
23. Consolidated Technology Solutions, SMARTJury, http://www.cts-america.com/
smartjury.asp (last accessed November 30, 2004); Charles Nesson, "Peremptory Challenges:
Technology Should Kill Them?" Law, Probabilityand Risk 3 (2003) 1-12.
24. ABC/ABC News, In the Jury Room, a seven-episode television series that premiered
on August 10, 2004.
25. It was reported in 2001 that 4.3% of federal criminal cases and 1.4% of federal civil
cases ended in a jury verdict. See William Glaberson, "Juries, Their Power Under Siege, Find
Their Role is Being Eroded," New York Times, March 2, 2001, A-1.
26. Frankel, "The Search for Truth," supra, note 11, 1038ff.
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impede it. It is hard to believe that Judge Frankel' s reservations apply with any
less force now than they did a quarter of a century ago.
In short: an adversarial system of justice is not an inherently hopeless way
to determine the truth under the inevitable time-pressures; but there is good
reason to fear that our present adversarial system is very far from optimal. It's
a bit like the peer-review system. Asking others in the field to read and
comment on work submitted is not an inherently hopeless way to determine
what work is worthy of publication. But in philosophy at least, the peer-review
system is now grossly overburdened as more and more people must publish to
get tenure, or even to get on tenure-track; corrupted by the many willing to use
their position to get friends' work published or rivals' work suppressed; and
well-known to be the coach-class of professional publishing, shunned by those
with enough frequent-flyer miles to be allowed into the first-class cabin of
prestigious publication-by-invitation. It is so far from optimal, in fact, that no
one really believes (whatever some administrators profess) that peer review is
either a necessary or a sufficient condition of good work.
IV. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF EXCLUSIONARY RULES
In Barefoot, Justice Blackmun had written an angry dissent focused on the
issues about evidence: "The Court holds that psychiatric testimony about a
defendant's future dangerousness is admissible, despite the fact that such testimony is wrong two times out of three ... because, it is said, the testimony is
subject to cross-examination and impeachment.... [T]his is too much for me.
... when a person's life is at stake, ... a requirement of greater reliability should
prevail."27 Cross-examination and impeachment may not be enough, he
argued, when flimsy evidence is presented to jurors in the guise of science.
At the time, scholars were still debating whether the old Frye rule, according to which novel scientific testimony is admissible only if it is generally
accepted in the field to which it belongs,28 had or hadn't been superseded with
the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975; for FRE 702 provided
simply that the testimony of a qualified expert, including a scientific expert,
is admissible if it is relevant and not otherwise excluded by law, and didn't
mention acceptance in the relevant community. The issue was resolved a
decade later, in Daubert;and this time it was Justice Blackmun who wrote the
ruling.
Describing Frye as "an austere standard, absent from, and incompatible
with, the Federal Rules of Evidence," and acknowledging that "[v]igorous
27. Barefoot v. Estelle, supra, note 18, 915 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting).
28. Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction
on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
shaky but admissible evidence,"29 the Court ruled unanimously that the Federal
Rules had superseded Frye. However, in a part of the ruling from which
Justices Rehnquist and Stevens dissented, Justice Blackmun added that FRE
702 requires that courts screen proffered expert testimony not only for relevance but also for reliability. Though both sides could declare victory-the
plaintiffs because Frye was set aside, the defendants because expert testimony
must now be screened for reliability-the new standard was in some ways
more stringent than the old. One suspects that Justice Blackmun may have
been remembering Thomas Barefoot, and hoping that tightened standards of
admissibility would keep out flimsy evidence.
This, however, brings us directly up against the second radical epistemological criticism of the Anglo-American legal system: that exclusionary rules
are inherently at odds with the epistemological desideratum of completeness.
This is the main theme of Bentham's treatise on evidence: "[t]he theorem to
be proved" is that "merely with a view to rectitude of decision, ... no species
ought to be excluded."30 For evidence to have proof evidence whatsoever ...
bative force, it must be not only correct, but also complete; evidence which is
true so far as it goes but which omits some essential point can be thoroughly
misleading. So, Bentham argues, exclusionary rules are to be avoided; the right
way to deal with misleading evidence is to put it in the context of further
evidence, either by bringing out more details by interrogation, or by introducing other witnesses. By these standards, the English jurisprudence on the subto the
ject of evidence, with its thicket of exclusionary rules, is "incompetent ...
discovery of truth, ... incompetent, therefore, ... to the purposes ofjustice"-as,
Bentham continues, is almost every rule that has ever been laid down on the
subject."
But does Bentham's critique of English evidence law in 1827 have any
relevance to evidence law here and now? I shall set aside complications posed
by the different rules in different states, the different rules for administrative
courts, different arrangements for grand juries, etc., etc., and focus on the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 102 sounds like something of which Bentham
29. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., supra, note 13, 596.
30. Bentham, Rationale of JudicialEvidence, supra, note 4, vol. 1, 1.
31. Ibid., 4. My knowledge of civil-law systems is limited to say the least; but I note for
the record that the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure adopted in 1948 abolished rules
disqualifying witnesses because of partiality and rules excluding hearsay (CJP, ch. 35, sec. 1).
The "principle of free evaluation of evidence" now allows every kind of evidence. Hugo Tiberg,
PAr Cronhult, and Fredrik Sterzel, eds., Swedish Law: A Survey, trans. James Hurst (Stockholm:
Juristfribaget, 1994), 494.
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would have approved: the Rules are to be construed so as "to secure fairness
in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and ...
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined., 32 And so does rule 402,
providing that "all relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided [by law].... Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 33 Rule
106 even specifically requires completeness: when a written or recorded statement, or part of such a statement, is introduced by one party, the other may
require the introduction of any other part or any other recorded statement
which ought in fairness to be considered along with it.
Rule 403, however, provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence., 34 In fact, the mesh of rules intended to keep out confusing or
misleading evidence is not so different, probably, from the English evidence
law that Bentham had condemned so severely. True, Bentham allows that rules
excluding evidence on grounds of "delay, vexation or expense" are justifiable,
provided the non-truth-related evil they prevent outweighs the truth-related
evil they cause. 35 But while he might have approved of some of our policyrelated exclusionary rules, he specifically argued against a rule allowing
spousal privilege; and I doubt he would have approved of, e.g., rule 407,
excluding evidence of subsequent measures which, had they been taken
sooner, might have prevented the damage for which the defendant is being
sued-presumably so as not to discourage landlords from fixing wonky steps
and such.
More to the epistemological point, however, is Bentham's discussion of
hearsay. Bentham classifies this as a species of "inferior evidence," because
it is liable to "a characteristic fraud": the fact that the person whose words are
reported cannot be cross-examined constitutes an incentive to lying. Nevertheless, he argues, "[w]hen standing by itself, this evidence, if false, is not at all
dangerous; it would have nothing to support it, and would probably be falsified
by ascertained circumstances." At the same time, "[i]n connection with other
proofs, it may be necessary for explaining and completing a series of facts."
As with "casual written evidence," "[i]ts exclusion may occasion the loss of

32. Rule 102, Federal Rules of Evidence, United States Code (U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2000), 854.
33. Ibid., 864.
34. Ibid., 865.
35. Bentham, Rationale of JudicialEvidence, supra, note 4, vol. 1, 3.
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information which cannot be obtained in any other way."36 So he would admit
such evidence unless the secondary witness is available to testify in person.
This, of course, runs almost exactly contrary to the Federal Rules, which exclude hearsay evidence unless otherwise provided, but allow numerous exceptions-many of them applicable even if the out-of-court declarant is available
as a witness. These exceptions-testimony as to secondary witnesses' statements of their sense impressions at the time they spoke, excited utterances,
dying declarations, then-existing mental, emotional or physical conditions, as
well as recorded recollections, etc., etc. -are allowed on the grounds that such
hearsay supposedly satisfies adequate "indicia of reliability."
Bentham is right to see completeness of evidence as a desideratum-though
I would prefer to put the point gradualistically: comprehensiveness of evidence
is one determinant of degree of warrant. However, it follows neither, as
Bentham believes, that the best strategy is to let in all evidence nor, as the FRE
assume, that the best strategy is to try to exclude unreliable evidence. It
doesn't follow that more evidence is always better than less, so that the policy
should be to let it all in; for additional-but-still-incomplete evidence may lead
us in the wrong direction, while the previously available even-more-incomplete evidence would have led us in the right direction. This is why Bentham
reaches for those modal qualifiers as he argues that if hearsay evidence is false,
other evidence will "probably" show it to be so, and that hearsay evidence
"may be" necessary to fill in the gaps in other testimony. But it doesn't follow,
either, that since we don't have all the evidence, the policy should be to
exclude potentially unreliable stuff. This is why, when Posner argues in favor
37
of exclusionary rules, he too reaches for words like "may," and "probably.
Both strategies have benefits; both have drawbacks.
As even a brief exploration of the exclusionary strategy with respect to
expert testimony as it plays out in Daubert and its progeny suggests, crafting
effective rules specifying indicia of reliability is harder than it sounds. For one
thing, while reliability is a matter of degree, an expert's testimony must either
be admitted, or not. For another, courts must decide with respect to each expert
whether his testimony should be admitted, in whole or in part; but the testimony of several experts might, in some instances, fit together in an explanatory story to give more credibility to a fact in issue than the testimony of any
one would do. This is in effect an application of Bentham's point that additional evidence may change the complexion of the evidence we already have;
36. Jeremy Bentham, A Treatise on Judicial Evidence, ed. M. Dumont (1825; repr.
Littleton, Colo.: Fred B. Rothman and Co., 1981), 201, 202, 200.
37. Posner, Frontiersin Legal Theory, supra, note 8, chaps. 11 and 12, passim; see e.g., p.
350 (trial by jury "may" produce in Darwinian fashion a higher quality of lawyer than bench
trials, in which a judge "may" seek to compensate for the inadequacies of the weaker lawyer).
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and also a kind of corollary of my theory: as the way a crossword entry interlocks with others may reasonably raise our confidence that it is correct, the
way that, e.g., an epidemiological study suggesting a weak correlation of substance S with disorder D interlocks with toxicological results suggesting a
possible mechanism by which S might sometimes cause this or that physiological damage, may reasonably increase our confidence that the statistical
results are not misleading.38
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has gradually modified and amplified what
it said in Daubertabout how to determine reliability, it has left more and more
to courts' discretion. According to Daubert, courts are look to a potential
witness's methodology, not his conclusions, and may refer to such factors as
falsifiability, the known or potential error rate, peer-review and publication,
and general acceptance in the scientific community. In Joiner,3 9 howeverruling that, even though excluding expert testimony may well be outcomedeterminative, the standard of review for such evidentiary decisions is abuse
of discretion, not some more stringent standard-the Supreme Court quietly
abandoned the distinction between methodology and conclusions on which it
had relied in Daubert. And in Kumho-ruling that Daubert applies to all
expert testimony, not only the scientific-the Supreme Court noted that the
factors on Daubert's "flexible" list may or may not be apropos, depending on
the kind of expertise involved; courts may use any, all, or none of them, or,
where appropriate, others of their own devising. 4°
In a way, Kumho's advice-in effect, that courts should use whatever
indicators of reliability are appropriate in a particular case and with respect to
a particular witness4-seems supremely sensible. (Think of the expert on
police training techniques in Berry,42 excluded for lack of peer-reviewed
publications; of the forensic document examiner in Starzecpyzel, 43 admitted
after a Dauberthearing the conclusion of which was that Daubertdidn't apply;
or of Dennis Carlson, the tire expert in Kumho, solemnly explaining his
"visual-inspection methodology"-he eye-balled the tires.) On the one hand,
readily applicable, specific criteria, such as whether the evidence has been
38. See Susan Haack, "An Epistemologist Among the Epidemiologists," Epidemiology 15.5
(September 2004) 51-2.
39. General Electric Co. v. Joiner,522 U.S. 136 (1997).
40. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) ("Daubert'slist of specific
factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case").
41. "[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the applicability of
the factors mentioned in Daubert.... Too much depends on the particular circumstances of the
particular case at issue." Kumho Tire, supra, note 40, 150.
42. Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994).
43. United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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published in a peer-reviewed journal, don't identify the reliable-enough reliably enough; but on the other hand, as the Kumho court acknowledges, its
much less specific advice relies heavily on courts' discretion-it's rather like
advising someone to "do the right thing." In practice, it seems, while since
Daubert federal courts have been tougher in excluding dubious expert testimony proffered by plaintiffs in tort cases, they have been less so with dubious
forensic testimony in criminal cases.
And in Texas, apparently, plus Va change, plus c'est la mgme chose. After
repeated reprimands for his irresponsible testimony in Texas capital cases, Dr.
Grigson was expelled from the American Psychiatric Association in 1995; but
even after his expulsion he continued to testify for the state of Texas. The
Texas rules of evidence are modeled on the Federal Rules; and in 1995 the
Texas Supreme Court adopted Daubert.4 In Nenno v. State, a 1998 capitalmurder case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the testimony of
a supervisor from the FBI Behavioral Science Unit that a person matching the
description established by evidence in the case "would be an extreme threat to
society," was admissible; arguing that the Daubertfactors need not apply outside the context of "hard science"-and thus using the fact that predictions of
future dangerousness are not "hard science" to justify a lower standard of
admissibility. 45 This decision preceded Kumho: but so far as I can see, there is
nothing in Kumho-which was cited approvingly in Texas evidentiary case
law just a month after it was decided4-that would have precluded it.
Because Daubert shifted some of the responsibility for determining the
quality of evidence away from the jury, the traditional decider of fact, to the
courts, it has prompted debate over whether judges or juries are likely to be
better at assessing the worth of complex and perhaps arcane expert evidence.
I think there is probably no good answer to this question, beyond "it depends
on the judge, the jury, and the evidence in question." The more important point
is that our rules of evidence are not designed to compensate for failures of the
adversarial system; for as the author of a text on the FRE observes, noting that
except in egregious cases ("plain error") a potentially reversible exclusion will
not be considered on appeal unless it was first brought to the attention of the
trial court, "[t]he adversary system, based on party responsibility, is47deeply
engrained in our jurisprudence, particularlyin the field of evidence.
44. El du Pont de Nemours v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995); the ruling
introduced two additional Daubert factors of its own: whether the technique depends on
subjective judgments, and whether it has non-judicial uses.
45. Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
46. Godsey v. State, 989 S.W.2d 482, 490 (Tex. App. 1999).
47. Michael Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence in a Nutshell, 6th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.:
West Publishing, 2003), 19 (emphasis added).
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And now we see that, just as the inclusive strategy that Bentham urges
would work poorly unless the advocates for the parties do a decent job of seeking out relevant evidence and of revealing the flaws in the dubious stuff
admitted along with everything else, so too the exclusionary strategy built into
our rules of evidence will also work poorly unless the parties do a decent job
of challenging dubious stuff to get it excluded. And thinking, for example, of
how much more feasible it is likely to be for a mammoth corporation than for
an indigent criminal defendant to make a Daubert challenge to proffered
expert testimony, we see that tweaking the rules of evidence is not the way to
compensate for large discrepancies in the parties' resources.

Hence my conclusion: "The American Way"-the way of adversarialism
and of exclusionary rules-is not an inherently bad way to determine the truth
in legal disputes; but as it presently works it isn't nearly as good a way as we
would ideally like it to be. In general, of course, what legal way of determining
the truth will work best at a given place or time is likely to depend in complicated ways on matters of history, culture, economics, and social mores; and
for our legal system to work significantly better would probably take changes
not only within the system itself, but also in the larger social context in which
it operates. But I will end here; for it really is beyond the competence of a
"person of mere theory" like myself to offer detailed proposals about how such
improvements, so desirable from the point of view of justice, might be
achieved.

